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The authors examined the roles of chronic expectancies and other
contextual information in the dispositional inference process
within the domain of ability judgments. Prior to viewing a vid-
eotaped performance under either cognitive load or no load, par-
ticipants in Studies 1 and 2 were given additional information
designed to constrain their categorizations of the performance.
In Study 2, chronic future-event expectancies also were assessed.
Analyses revealed that when under cognitive load, participants’
ability inferences were assimilated to the constraint information
(Studies 1 and 2) and to chronic expectancies (Study 2). Fur-
thermore, Study 2 analyses revealed that these effects were medi-
ated by participants’ behavior categorizations. Evidence sugges-
tive of a proceduralized form of correction for task difficulty
(Studies 1 and 2) and an effortful, awareness-based correction
for the constraint information and for chronic expectancies also
was found. Results are examined in light of recent models of the
dispositional inference process.
When extracting information about others’ enduring
dispositions from their behavior, perceivers may have
access to a vast array of contextual cues, including prior
information about the target, situational information,
and event-outcome information. Perceivers also have at
their disposal knowledge structures, such as schemas
and stereotypes, as well as naïve theories about such
things as the malleability of traits (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995) and trait-behavior relations (Reeder & Brewer,
1979). With so many potential influences on the social
inference process, researchers are faced with the intrigu-
ing and complicated task of trying to determine how
these factors interact to influence the dispositional infer-
ences perceivers make about others.
One of the most frequently rendered and consequen-
tial dispositional judgments we make about others con-
cerns their levels of ability. In the current research, we
explored the impact of prior behavior category informa-
tion and chronic expectancies, the use of situational
information, and the mediational role of behavior cate-
gorizations in the process of drawing inferences about
another’s ability. We especially were interested in exam-
ining the mechanisms through which chronic expectan-
cies exert their biasing impact on dispositional infer-
ences (Reich & Weary, 1998). Do chronic, generalized
future-event expectancies guide dispositional inferences
by first steering perceivers toward a particular initial
interpretation of another’s behavior? If so, are
perceivers able to fully correct both their categorizations
of the behavior and their dispositional inferences for the
effects of such expectancies when they have the cognitive
resources and motivation necessary to do so?
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Answers to such questions might both extend and
challenge current models of the process by which
perceivers transform social information into dispos-
itional inferences. Before delving into such questions,
however, it might be useful to examine current theory
and research pertaining to the dispositional inference
process.
STAGE MODELS OF THE
SOCIAL INFERENCE PROCESS
Although differing in important ways, the current
models of the social inference process (Gilbert, Pelham, &
Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986) generally suggest that when
making dispositional judgments, perceivers typically
progress through a series of stages. More specifically,
they propose that perceivers first categorize a behavioral
event in terms of attributionally relevant categories (e.g.,
a successful performance). Because the default inferen-
tial goal often is a dispositional one (cf. Krull, 1993),
perceivers next make a correspondent inference about
the target’s disposition (e.g., he is an intelligent person)
and adjust this inference for other factors that might
have contributed to the target’s behavior (e.g., an easy or
difficult task).
The models also suggest that these stages differ in
their cognitive resource requirements (Gilbert et al.
1988; Trope, 1986). All state that the early stages of
behavior categorization and initial characterization of
the target in dispositional terms require relatively few
cognitive resources and, therefore, occur relatively auto-
matically. As a result, these stages are thought to be less
vulnerable to disruption by factors that affect perceivers’
ability and motivation to process. They may be suscepti-
ble, however, to influence by a variety of salient contex-
tual cues and by perceivers’ prior and accessible knowl-
edge of the target and the situation.
That such contextual and prior information may alter
the outcome of the early stages of the inference process
recently has been demonstrated by Trope and his col-
leagues (see Trope & Gaunt, 1999, for a review). In one
study, for example, Trope and Alfieri (1997) found that
knowledge of existing situational pressures impinging
on targets appeared to assist perceivers at an automatic,
implicit level in narrowing the range of their possible
behavior categorizations and target characterizations.
Specifically, they found that both participants’ behavior
categorizations and derivative, correspondent target
characterizations were automatically perceived as consis-
tent with the prior situational information when the tar-
get’s behavior was ambiguous. Because this assimilative
process occurred at the early, relatively automatic stages
of the inference process and therefore was not con-
scious, Trope and Alfieri (1997) contended that their
participants likely experienced both behavior and target
judgments as direct perceptions.
What of the final stage of the inference process?
According to the current models of the inference pro-
cess, the inferential correction stage generally requires
more cognitive resources than do the earlier stages of
behavior categorization and target characterization. As a
result, it is susceptible to disruption by factors that
reduce the motivation or the ability to process informa-
tion effortfully. Several studies, for example, have dem-
onstrated that participants who are unmotivated or
cognitively distracted (i.e., diverting attention to
another task) fail to use situational information to cor-
rect their initial dispositional judgments (e.g., Gilbert et al.,
1988; Reeder, 1997; Reich & Weary, 1998; Trope &
Alfieri, 1997; Yost & Weary, 1996).
CHRONIC EXPECTANCIES AND THE
DISPOSITIONAL INFERENCE PROCESS
In the current research, we focused on the role of
perceivers’ generalized event-outcome expectancies in
the dispositional inference process. More specifically,
previous research by Andersen and her colleagues
(Andersen, 1990; Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992)
has shown that the pessimistic future-event expectancies
held by depressed students are chronically accessible
and efficient and that they are applied to predictions
about both the self and others; in contrast, the more pos-
itive expectancies of nondepressed students, although
neither chronic nor efficient, are associated with more
optimistic predictions about the self and others.
Reich and Weary (1998) recently examined in two
studies whether these stored knowledge structures could
impact the dispositional inference process. In their
research, Reich and Weary asked depressed and
nondepressed participants to observe a target’s relatively
successful performance on a test of cognitive ability and
then to make inferences about his or her general level of
ability. These investigators assumed that their depressed
participants would categorize the target’s behavior in
line with their chronic expectancies. They further
assumed that the behavior categorizations of both
depressed and nondepressed participants would deter-
mine their subsequent characterizations of the target
and would serve as a context for their interpretations of
the nonfocal situational factor of task difficulty. That is,
the more negative (positive) behavior categorizations of
depressed (nondepressed) participants should lead
them to interpret the moderate difficulty of the task as
an inhibitory (facilitative) cause of the target’s moder-
ately (highly) successful performance. Moreover, this
contextual influence of behavior categorizations on
task-difficulty inferences should affect the direction of
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inferential correction. When motivated and able to
engage in inferential correction, perceivers generally
augment target inferences for inhibitory factors and dis-
count them for facilitative factors. These opposing direc-
tions of inferential correction on the part of depressed
and nondepressed participants in no-load conditions of
the Reich and Weary studies, then, were expected to
obscure any initial depressed-nondepressed differences
in target inferences.
In accord with their predictions, Reich and Weary
(1998) found that when under a cognitive load,
depressed compared to nondepressed participants
rated the target lower in ability. When not under load,
their corrected dispositional inferences were similar. Of
importance, in a second study these interactive effects of
depression and cognitive load were replicated and it was
revealed that the depressed-nondepressed differences
in inferences that occurred under conditions of cogni-
tive load were attributable to perceivers’ chronic, gener-
alized event-outcome expectancies. It should be noted,
however, that several of Reich and Weary’s key process
assumptions could not be tested directly in their
research; in neither study were participants’ behavior
categorizations directly manipulated or assessed.
CURRENT RESEARCH
If chronic expectancies exert their effects on
dispositional inferences by narrowing the range of cate-
gorizations participants are prepared to make for an
observed performance, then an experimental manipula-
tion that restricts the range of likely categorizations of
the performance should replicate the load condition
findings of Reich and Weary (1998). In two studies, we
employed such a manipulation. We gave participants,
prior to their observation of the tape, information
designed to suggest that the level of the target’s general
performance had been either successful or unsuccess-
ful. In Study 2, we also assessed participants’ generalized
future-event expectancies.
A secondary purpose of the current research was to
examine more completely when, how, and for what fac-
tors perceivers’ inferences about cognitive ability are
corrected. As noted earlier, Reich and Weary (1998) sug-
gested that perceivers’ behavior categorizations would
influence their interpretations of the nonfocal situa-
tional factor as a facilitative or inhibitory cause of the tar-
get’s performance. They further argued that perceivers
would correct their initial target inferences for this fac-
tor. In the current research, we examined the possible
correction of target judgments for the perceived ease or
difficulty of the task. Although past attribution research
generally has forced on participants the prompt to adjust
target inferences for situational factors (e.g., by telling
them that a speaker was assigned to argue a given topic
or that a person was discussing an anxiety-provoking sub-
ject), in the current research we gave them no specific,
prior information about the situational context. Conse-
quently, they were forced to generate their own infer-
ences about the situational context and were allowed to
correct (or not) for those inferences. We also examined
possible correction of target inferences for the potential
diagnosticity of the performance-level information
(Studies 1 and 2) and for the potential bias introduced
by perceivers’ chronic expectancies (Study 2).
STUDY 1
Our procedures and materials for Study 1 were nearly
identical to those employed by Reich and Weary (1998,
Study 2). The single alteration involved informing par-
ticipants that the particular child they would be observ-
ing on the tape either had or had not met the time
requirements for completing the videotaped test items
and therefore either was or was not successful enough to
continue testing. Under load conditions, we expected
that participants who received information suggesting
that the performance was relatively successful would cat-
egorize the performance as more successful than would
participants who learned that the performance was rela-
tively unsuccessful, they should then make correspon-
dent characterizations of the child’s ability. Under
no-load conditions, perceivers should have sufficient
cognitive resources available to engage in effortful cor-
rection of their target characterizations for contextual
factors.
In Study 1, there were two types of contextual factors
for which participants might adjust their characteriza-
tions of the target. First, there were various cues relevant
to the diagnosticity or sufficiency of the perfor-
mance-level information. That is, we expected that our
information indicating that the target either had or had
not met the time requirements for the set of test items
would be sufficient, at least initially, to constrain but not
fully determine participants’ ability inferences. It
seemed possible, however, that the value of this informa-
tion for behavior categorizations and target inferences
(Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Krull & Erickson, 1995)
might well be reevaluated by our participants when they
had adequate cognitive resources. They might, for exam-
ple, call to mind other behavioral cues relevant to an
assessment of the target’s performance level. They also
might consider the fact that they had seen only a small
portion of the child’s overall performance and that they
had received no information about his or her perfor-
mance on other test items. Should this occur, our
no-load participants should give lesser weight to the per-
formance-level information and should adjust their
dispositional judgments accordingly.
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The second factor in Study 1 for which participants
might correct their inferences was the perceived ease or
difficulty of the task. Such corrections should result in a
positive relationship between perceptions of task diffi-
culty and inferences of high ability. Should we expect to
see this relationship for both successful and unsuccessful
target performances? Although Reich and Weary (1998)
suggested that we should, Reeder (1997) has argued that
perceivers may possess beliefs that a strong performance
requires high ability, whereas a weak performance
requires neither a high nor a low ability level. As a conse-
quence, we could find adjustment of dispositional infer-
ences for the contributory effects of situational factors
but only when ability is not a necessary causal fac-
tor—only for unsuccessful target performances. We
examined these possibilities in Study 1.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 86 undergraduate students who
completed the study in exchange for partial course
credit in an introductory psychology course. The data
for 3 participants were not analyzed for various reasons:
1 participant previously had viewed the video in a related
experiment and 2 others failed to understand the exper-
imental instructions. The remaining sample included 34
male and 49 female participants. Participants attended
experimental sessions in groups of three to six and were
randomly assigned to performance-level conditions.
Assignment to cognitive load conditions was done on the
basis of random assignment of small groups.
MATERIALS
The 5-minute videotape used in the experiment was
identical to the one used by Reich and Weary (1998). It
showed an 11-year-old boy performing four moderately
difficult tasks from the block design subtest of the Stan-
ford-Binet intelligence test. Each 30- to 78-second clip
showed the child beginning and completing a different
puzzle. The picture key to the test and the examiner’s
head occasionally obstructed participants’ views of the
child’s work, thereby making it difficult to tell whether
the task was being completed successfully. To make the
child’s level of performance even more vague, the audio
was omitted from the tape (Borkenau & Liebler, 1995).
PROCEDURE
Participants were seated in a semicircle facing a large
television and VCR. The experimenter explained to par-
ticipants that they would be asked to watch a videotape of
a child performing a spatial ability task, to complete a
questionnaire regarding their impressions of the child’s
performance, and to fill out a few scales for the Psychol-
ogy Department. Participants then read instructions
informing them that they would watch one of four 5-min-
ute videotapes of a child performing several tasks that
were part of a full-length intelligence test. They learned
that the children on the tapes differed in their levels of
intelligence and that the tasks, which measured an
important component of general intelligence, varied in
their levels of difficulty. The instructions also stated that
whereas some children performed their tasks quite suc-
cessfully, others were less successful.
All participants then received the following
dispositional inferential goal instructions:
It will be your task to figure out HOW INTELLIGENT
THE CHILD IS in general. As you know, very intelligent
people sometimes appear less intelligent because they
are performing a very difficult task and less intelligent
people sometimes appear very intelligent because they
are performing a very simple task. We do not want you to
tell us how intelligent the child merely appears. Instead,
we want you to watch the child on the tape and figure out
how intelligent you think the child is in general.
These instructions have been found to be sufficient to
motivate participants to engage in inferential correction
when ample cognitive resources are available (Reich &
Weary, 1998). They also may serve to increase the accessi-
bility and applicability of a compensatory schema for the
effects of ability and task difficulty on the target’s
performance.
Manipulation of cognitive load. To manipulate the
attentional resources available for inferential correc-
tion, participants in the cognitive load conditions were
informed that an eight-digit number would appear on
the screen at the beginning of the videotape. They were
asked to rehearse this number as they watched the tape
and completed the main dependent measures. For these
participants, the number appeared on an otherwise blank
screen for 20 seconds prior to the appearance of the
child working on the spatial ability tasks. Participants in
the no-load conditions received no information about
the memory task and did not see the number.
Manipulation of performance-level information. After
reading the instructions, one participant in each group
was asked to choose a slip of paper from a box to deter-
mine which of the four videos the group would watch;
the videos were positioned beside the television screen
with different labels. The tapes were actually identical
but the choice of a tape was intended to lead participants
to believe that they were randomly selecting a video-
taped performance from a range of performance levels
rather than being shown one that had been specifically
selected for its particular characteristics. The experi-
menter then announced the chosen video (e.g., Child 1,
Task S) and removed six laminated index cards from its
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jacket. While distributing a card to each participant, the
experimenter announced that the cards contained addi-
tional information about this particular video. Partici-
pants were asked to read the card carefully and then to
give it back to the experimenter.
The cards, which contained the following informa-
tion, were designed to constrain participants’ categoriza-
tions of the performance.1
Additional Information:
CHILD (number), TASK (letter)
All of the individual test items you will see on this
video were timed. In order to move on to the next set of
test items, the child needed to complete all items in the
current set within a certain time frame.
(Success condition): This child managed to complete
the set of test items you will be viewing, and he was also
quite successful in meeting the time requirements. Con-
sequently, he was successful enough to continue testing.
(Failure condition): Although this child managed to
complete the set of test items you will be viewing, he was
not successful in meeting the time requirements. Conse-
quently, he was not successful enough to continue
testing.
After reading the paragraph and before viewing the
tape, participants were reminded that their goal was to
diagnose the child’s intelligence level and, for those in
the cognitive load condition, also to rehearse the num-
ber that would appear at the beginning of the video.
Dependent measures. Immediately after viewing the
tape, participants completed items designed to assess
their dispositional and situational inferences. The
dispositional measure asked participants to rate the
child’s general intellectual level (1 = very low, 9 = very
high), and the situational measure asked participants to
rate the difficulty of the spatial ability task (1 = not at all
difficult, 9 = very difficult). These measures were pre-
sented in counterbalanced order across participants.
After completing them, participants in the cognitive
load condition recorded the number they had
rehearsed. Next, all participants completed an item
designed to check on the manipulation of performance
level; specifically, they indicated how well they thought
the child had done on the spatial ability task (1 = very
poorly, 9 = very well). Participants then rated on 9-point
scales the child’s likability, sociability, nervousness, and
activity level. They also rated their engagement with or
interest in the tape. After completing a few additional
scales, participants were debriefed and dismissed.
Results2
Past research (Weary & Reich, 1999) using the gen-
eral procedures employed in Study 1 has found that par-
ticipants sometimes differ in their self-reports of engage-
ment with the video observation task. Moreover, this vari-
able at times has been found to account for a significant
amount of variance in behavior and target inferences,
such that high task engagement is associated with higher
behavior and target ratings. Initial analyses, however,
indicated that task engagement was not a significant
covariate for any of the dependent measures employed
in Study 1. Consequently, this variable was not included
in any of the analyses reported below.
COGNITIVE LOAD
MANIPULATION CHECK
Participants in the cognitive load conditions (N = 41)
recalled and correctly positioned 86% of the digits in the
eight-digit number. In a cognitive load procedure, a
small number of mistakes is desirable because it indi-
cates both that participants were seriously engaging in
the rehearsal task and that the task was difficult enough
to be cognitively demanding. Because a large number of
mistakes may indicate that participants were not effec-
tively engaged in the cognitive load task, and therefore
were not under any cognitive load, several researchers
suggest excluding participants who recall fewer than half
of the digits (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). In the current
study, 4 participants recalled fewer than four digits; in
accord with the above recommendation, their data were
excluded from further analyses. For the remaining par-
ticipants, digit recall did not vary as a function of perfor-
mance-level condition (p > .79).
PERFORMANCE-LEVEL CHECK
A 2 (cognitive load: load, no load) × 2 (performance
level: success, failure) × 2 (gender) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was performed on participants’ perceived
performance-level ratings. This analysis revealed only
the predicted main effect of performance level, F(1, 75)
= 16.49, p < .001, such that participants in the failure (M =
6.00) compared to the success (M = 7.37) condition indi-
cated that the child had performed less well.
TARGET AND TASK INFERENCES
A 2 (cognitive load: load, no load) × 2 (performance
level: success, failure) × 2 (gender) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was performed on participants’ ratings on the
dispositional inference measure. This analysis revealed a
main effect of performance level, F(1, 71) = 5.08, p < .03,
such that participants in the failure condition rated the
child as less intelligent (M = 6.00) than did those in the
success condition (M = 6.58). This main effect was quali-
fied by the predicted two-way interaction of load and
performance level, F(1, 71) = 7.76, p < .01. As predicted,
the relatively automatic target characterizations made
under conditions of cognitive load were assimilated to
the performance-level information, whereas the target
inferences made under no-load conditions did not dif-
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fer. See Table 1 for the means and results of a priori
comparisons.
A similar three-way ANOVA was conducted on partici-
pants’ ratings on the task-difficulty measure and
revealed a significant Load × Performance Level interac-
tion, F(1, 79) = 4.41, p < .04. The relatively automatic
characterizations of the task made under conditions of
cognitive load indicated that participants who received
failure information perceived the task as less difficult
compared to those who received success information;
this pattern was reversed in the no-load conditions. How-
ever, none of the pairwise comparisons of means within
either load or no-load conditions reached conventional
levels of significance (see Table 1).
CORRECTION OF TARGET INFERENCES
The analyses of the dispositional inference measure
suggested that participants were able to correct their
ability inferences under no-load conditions either by
reducing the weight given to the performance-level
information, by adjusting for the difficulty of the task, or
both. We examined these possibilities by regressing
dispositional inferences on standardized task-difficulty
ratings, the performance-level variable, and their inter-
action.3 Finally, we examined whether any correction for
task difficulty that occurred was moderated by perfor-
mance level, as suggested by Reeder (1997).
We report the results for the load conditions first
where correction for task difficulty generally would not
be expected. The regression analysis revealed that both
the performance-level variable (β = .52, p < .001) and
participants’ task-difficulty inferences (β = .28, p < .05)
significantly predicted their dispositional ratings. Those
participants who received failure information rated the
target’s ability as lower compared to those who received
success information. Somewhat surprisingly, partici-
pants augmented their ability inferences to the degree
that they perceived the task as difficult, and they did so
for both successful and unsuccessful outcomes (interac-
tion β = –.13, p = .38).
Next, we report the same analysis conducted for the
no-load conditions, where correction for both perfor-
mance-level information and task difficulty theoretically
would be expected. As predicted, this analysis indicated
that when participants had the requisite cognitive
resources, they reduced the weight given to the perfor-
mance-level information (β = .04, p = .76). As in the pre-
ceding analysis, they also corrected their dispositional
inferences for the perceived difficulty of the task (β = .35,
p < .04), regardless of the valence of the outcome (inter-
action β = –.08, p < .59).
ANCILLARY MEASURES
It is possible that the interaction of the cognitive load
and performance-level manipulations affected partici-
pants’ global evaluative judgments of the target rather
than having effects that were specific to goal-relevant
judgments (i.e., ability inferences). However, separate
three-way ANOVAs conducted on participants’ ratings of
the child’s likability, sociability, and activity level pro-
vided no support for this possibility.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed, as predicted, that the
performance-level manipulation constrained initial tar-
get characterizations. That is, load condition partici-
pants who received success information inferred a corre-
spondingly higher level of intelligence compared to
participants who received failure information. In con-
trast, under no-load conditions, inferences about the tar-
get’s level of ability did not differ as a function of the per-
formance-level information. Thus, when participants
were able to engage in effortful correction of their
dispositional inferences for the performance-level infor-
mation, they appeared to do so. Whether this correction
occurred through direct or indirect means (i.e., through
recategorization of their behavior perceptions) could
not be determined because no measure of participants’
relatively automatic behavior categorizations was
included.
Participants also appeared to use their judgments of
task difficulty to adjust their ability inferences. As pre-
dicted, inferences of greater task difficulty were associ-
ated with inferences of higher target intelligence, even
after the effects of the performance-level manipulation
were statistically controlled. Interestingly, this result
obtained under both no-load and load conditions where
participants arguably were less able to engage in effortful
processing.
The possibility of such efficient adjustment of
dispositional inferences certainly would seem to be
inconsistent with the arguments of some researchers
(e.g., Gilbert et al., 1988). However, the general notion
that situational factors, when salient, accessible, and
applicable, may influence the early stages of the infer-
ence process is consistent with recent data (Trope &
Gaunt, 1999). What is noteworthy here is that we found
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TABLE 1: Performance Level × Cognitive Load Means
Cognitive Load No Load
Success Failure Success Failure
Variable (n = 17) (n = 20) (n = 21) (n = 21)
Dispositional
ability 6.86a (0.99) 5.45b (0.90) 6.38 (1.90) 6.52 (1.13)
Task difficulty 5.88 (1.62) 5.15 (1.14) 5.28 (1.74) 5.91 (1.34)
NOTE: Within level of cognitive load, means with different subscripts
differ significantly at p < .01. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
such effects when no specific situational information
had been provided to participants.
It seems entirely possible that our general instruc-
tions suggesting that both ability and task difficulty typi-
cally affect performance might not only have made par-
ticipants’ self-generated situational inferences salient
but also might have activated proceduralized correction
processes (Lucas, Krull, & Pelham, 1999; Weary, Tobin, &
Reich, 1999). Heider’s (1958) analysis of perceivers’
intuitive theories of action suggested the operation of a
compensatory schema (Kelley, 1972) for the effects of
ability and environmental difficulty on performance
outcomes. This schema implies that in contributing to a
successful performance, a high level of ability compen-
sates for a difficult task and an easy task compensates for
a low level of ability. To the degree, then, that our
research participants had extensive experience in judg-
ing the important dimension of cognitive ability, they
might have possessed well-rehearsed compensatory
schemata that operate with relative efficiency. They
might then have been able to adjust their ability infer-
ences for task difficulty, even when their cognitive
resources were depleted.
Finally, it is interesting to note that situational correc-
tion of dispositional inferences was not limited to the
unsuccessful performance condition. This failure to
find support for Reeder’s (1997) notion of asymmetrical
correction as a function of our performance-level infor-
mation could be the result of a variety of procedural dif-
ferences between his studies and ours. For example, we
used task difficulty as our situational factor; to our knowl-
edge, Reeder has not examined this factor in his studies
of inferential correction. In addition, the situational
information in our studies was inferred by, rather than
provided to, participants.
STUDY 2
In Study 1, we replicated the dispositional inference
findings of Reich and Weary (1998) by using a manipula-
tion designed to constrain participants’ categorizations
of the target’s performance. In Study 2, we attempted to
provide a more direct test of Reich and Weary’s argu-
ments regarding the effects of perceivers’ chronic expec-
tancies on dispositional inferences. Toward this end, we
used the same general procedure that was employed in
Study 1 but we also included an instrument designed to
assess the content of perceivers’ generalized, chronic
future-event expectancies (Andersen, 1990). Using
items from the future-event expectancy scale (FES),
Andersen et al. (1992) have shown that people who
exhibit pessimism (i.e., moderately depressed individu-
als) also demonstrate greater automaticity in their
future-event predictions both for themselves and for oth-
ers. Moreover, those who score below the median on the
FES (i.e., those with relatively pessimistic predictions)
have been shown to draw relatively automatic and pessi-
mistic inferences about another person when under cog-
nitive load (Reich & Weary, 1998). Thus, this scale was
used in the current research as an indicator of the
chronic accessibility of participants’ future-event
expectancies.
It is important to note, however, that the addition of
chronic expectancies to an analysis in which behavior
categorizations have been constrained by the perfor-
mance-level manipulation provides a conservative test of
the effects of such expectancies. That is, because the per-
formance-level manipulation served as a restriction on
the plausible range of categorizations, the automatic
influence of and the correction for participants’ chronic
future-event expectancies should be less pronounced in
this study than in Reich and Weary (1998).
An additional goal of Study 2 was to examine the
mediational role of behavior categorizations. We there-
fore included an index of participants’ behavior catego-
rizations. In accord with past research, we expected that
participants’ dispositional inferences would be assimi-
lated both to their chronic expectancies and to the per-
formance-level information under load conditions. We
further expected that these main effects would be medi-
ated by participants’ behavior categorizations.
What about inferential corrections under no-load
conditions? Reich and Weary (1998) assumed that the
attenuation of the effects of chronic, future-event expec-
tancies on dispositional inferences in the no-load condi-
tions of their studies was due to situational correction.
However, the results of the current Study 1 suggested
that correction for situational factors occurred under
both load and no-load conditions. An alternative possi-
bility is that the participants’ correction of dispositional
inferences in Reich and Weary resulted from
recategorization of the target’s behavior and a corre-
sponding correction of target judgments in light of the
possible biasing influence of chronic expectancies. The
current Study 2 permitted an examination of this possi-
bility as well as the possibility that the correction of
dispositional inferences for the performance-level infor-
mation observed in Study 1 was due to recategorization
of the target’s behavior.
We should note here that few attribution researchers
have given much attention to the notion that
recategorization of observed behavior may be one mech-
anism whereby dispositional inferences are corrected. In
fact, some have argued that such recategorization does
not occur (Trope & Alfieri, 1997). However, a few
researchers recently have found evidence that, with suffi-
cient motivation and cognitive resources, perceivers can
effortfully correct their categorizations for biasing influ-
ences, at least under certain circumstances (Thompson,
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Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994). For exam-
ple, Weary et al. (1999) recently have demonstrated that
perceivers can recategorize behavior if they are aware of
a biasing influence on their initial judgments and if they
perceive that influence to be illegitimate.
Finally, we again investigated the role of task-difficulty
inferences in the dispositional inference process. In
accord with the results of Study 1, we expected that par-
ticipants would augment their dispositional inferences
to the degree that they perceived the task as difficult and
that they would do so under both load and no-load
conditions.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 201 university students who com-
pleted the study in exchange for partial course credit in
an introductory psychology course. Seven participants
were excluded from analyses for various reasons: 4 par-
ticipants in one experimental session were inadvertently
exposed to loud noise from outside the experimental
room, 1 did not understand the instructions, and 2 oth-
ers previously had viewed the video in a related experi-
ment. After these exclusions, the sample included 194
students (n = 66 men, n = 126 women, n = 2 gender not
indicated). Participants generally attended experimen-
tal sessions in groups of two to six and were assigned ran-
domly to performance-level conditions. Random assign-
ment to cognitive load conditions was done on the basis
of small groups.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The same videotape and experimental manipulations
used in Study 1 were employed here. A few notable
changes, however, were made to the procedure. First, in
Study 2 we included before the cognitive load recall task
(i.e., before termination of the cognitive load manipula-
tion) an assessment of participants’ perceptions of the
level of the child’s performance. This change was
designed to permit an assessment of participants’ rela-
tively automatic behavior categorizations. Specifically,
we included the manipulation check item from Study 1
that asked participants how well the target had per-
formed the task and an additional item that read as fol-
lows: “The success of the children’s performance on the
four videotapes you chose from differed. What level of
performance (1 = very successful, 9 = very unsuccessful) was
depicted in the tape you watched?” The order of these
questions and the dispositional inference measure were
counterbalanced; the task-difficulty measure always fol-
lowed them. Second, to ensure that differences in cate-
gorizations and inferences as a function of cognitive load
were not due to differential attention to or encoding of
the video, we added four items assessing recall for video
details.
Scales. After completing the experimental question-
naire, all participants completed in counterbalanced
order the FES developed by Andersen (1990) and the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, 1967). These
scales were introduced as part of a separate study being
conducted by the Psychology Department. The FES con-
tains 26 items describing both positive and negative
events. Participants are asked to indicate on an 11-point
scale (–5 = extremely unlikely, +5 = extremely likely) the likeli-
hood of each event happening to them at some point in
their lives. After completing these two scales, partici-
pants were fully debriefed, with one exception. In accord
with local internal review board requirements, they were
not told that the BDI was a measure of depressive
symptoms.
Results
In Study 2, the measure of task engagement proved to
be a significant covariate in a number of the analyses.
Where it was, we checked that the assumption of homo-
geneity of regression coefficients was met and then con-
ducted analyses that equated participants for this nui-
sance variable. For all analyses where the covariate
proved to be significant, we report those results. Note
that in all such instances, the reported effects were simi-
lar to (albeit often somewhat stronger than) those
obtained without the statistical removal of the covariate.4
COGNITIVE LOAD
MANIPULATION CHECK
The percentage of digits correctly recalled and posi-
tioned by participants was comparable to that found in
Study 1 (M = 93%). The 4 participants who recalled
fewer than four digits were excluded from further analy-
ses, as in Study 1 and in accord with past research
(Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). For the remaining partici-
pants, there were no effects of performance level, FES
group, or their interaction on digit recall (ps > .56).
Thus, the cognitive load task appears to have successfully
engaged participants regardless of condition.
VIDEO RECALL
Participants responded to four multiple-choice ques-
tions about various details of the video, including the
number of test items performed by the target, the color
of the child’s shirt, the background, and the color of the
test administrator’s hair. A 2 (cognitive load: load, no
load) × 2 (performance level: success, failure) × 2 (FES
group: positive, negative) × 2 (gender) ANOVA revealed
no significant main effect of cognitive load; however, it
did yield an unexpected interaction of performance
level and load, F(1, 171) = 5.45, p < .03. Tukey’s HSD pro-
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cedure for comparing unequal cell sizes revealed only
that the mean recall for load (M = 3.33) and no-load (M =
2.87) participants in the success conditions differed sig-
nificantly (p < .05). Of importance, the direction of this
effect is opposite to what would have been expected if
the load manipulation had interfered with participants’
processing of the videotape. Overall, the average recall
was 3.11 items.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FOR ANDERSEN’S SCALE
FES scores were calculated by subtracting the sum of
participants’ likelihood ratings for the 13 negative
events from the sum of their likelihood ratings for the 13
positive events. Total scores ranged from –57 to 123, with
a mean of 41.14 and a median of 41. One participant did
not fully complete the FES and was dropped from subse-
quent analyses. Consistent with past research (Reich &
Weary, 1998; Weary et al., 1999), a median split proce-
dure was used to divide participants into two FES groups:
negative (N = 94) and positive (N = 95).5, 6 The 3 partici-
pants with scores at the median were included in the pos-
itive FES group.
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
The BDI and FES were administered at the end of the
experimental session to avoid priming negative affect
and depression-related thoughts (Spielman & Bargh,
1990). It therefore was necessary to demonstrate that
participants’ scores on these measures were not influ-
enced by the experimental manipulations or by partici-
pant gender. A 2 (performance level)× 2 (load)× 2 (gen-
der) ANOVA performed on each of these measures
revealed no significant effects (ps > .12).
TARGET, BEHAVIOR,
AND TASK INFERENCES
A 2 (load) × 2 (performance level) × 2 (FES) × 2 (gen-
der) ANCOVA was performed on the measure of
dispositional inference. This analysis revealed a tendency
for negative FES participants to see the target as less intel-
ligent than positive FES participants (Ms = 6.40 vs. 6.85),
F(1, 169) = 2.74, p = .10. There also was a main effect of
performance level, F(1, 169) = 7.25, p < .01; participants
in the failure condition rated the child as less intelligent
(M = 6.34) than did those in the success condition (M =
6.90). The performance-level main effect, however, was
qualified by the predicted two-way interaction of load
and performance level, F(1, 169) = 5.66, p < .01. The pat-
tern of means involved in this interaction effect and the
results of a priori comparisons were similar to those
found in Study 1 (see Table 2). As expected, target infer-
ences were assimilated to the performance-level infor-
mation under load but not under no-load conditions.
Because the two behavior categorization items were
highly correlated (r = .71, p < .01), they were averaged to
create a categorization index. Participants’ ratings on
this index and on the measure of task difficulty were sub-
jected to separate four-way ANCOVAs. For the categori-
zation index, the analysis revealed results that paralleled
those obtained on the dispositional inference measure.
Negative FES participants saw the performance as less suc-
cessful than did positive FES participants (Ms = 6.90 vs.
7.29), F(1, 169) = 4.10, p = .04. It also yielded a main
effect of performance level, F(1, 169) = 29.35, p < .001.
This effect, however, was qualified by the predicted
two-way interaction of load and performance level, F(1,
169) = 3.75, p = .05. As seen in Table 2, participants’
behavior categorizations were assimilated to the perfor-
mance-level information under load; under no-load con-
ditions this difference, although still apparent, was atten-
uated. No significant effects associated with FES, load, or
performance level were obtained for the task-difficulty
measure.
MEDIATIONAL ANALYSES
Theoretically, we would expect the effects of our per-
formance-level manipulation and participants’ chronic
expectancies on their dispositional inferences to be
mediated by their categorizations of the child’s perfor-
mance under cognitive load conditions, but this effect
should be attenuated under no-load conditions (Trope,
1986). Because both our hypotheses and the effects of
the performance-level manipulation on dispositional
inferences varied systematically as a function of the cog-
nitive load manipulation, we chose to examine our
mediational hypotheses separately for the load and
no-load conditions. We followed the procedures out-
lined by Baron and Kenny (1986) for such tests. These
authors suggest that evidence for mediation requires
three patterns of relationships: (a) the predictor should
be correlated with the criterion, (b) the predictor
should be correlated with the mediator, and (c) the
mediator should affect the criterion, after controlling
for the effect of the predictor. To establish mediation,
the effects of the predictor on the criterion should
become nonsignificant (full mediation) or be suffi-
ciently reduced in significance (partial mediation) when
the effects of the mediator are controlled.
First, we conducted a series of regressions and a modi-
fication of the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to assess
whether the effects of performance level and of partici-
pants’ chronic expectancies on adjusted dispositional
inferences were mediated by participants’ categoriza-
tions of the child’s performance under cognitive load
conditions. Specifically, we regressed dispositional infer-
ences on both performance and FES levels. Both vari-
ables (performance level β = .36, p < .001; FES β = .17, p <
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.09) predicted dispositional inferences in the expected
direction. Next, we regressed the adjusted categoriza-
tion index on performance and FES levels. Both perfor-
mance level (β = .50, p < .001) and FES (β = .18, p < .05)
significantly predicted the mediator and behavior cate-
gorizations. Finally, we regressed dispositional infer-
ences on performance level, FES level, and the categori-
zation index. Behavior categorizations were significant
predictors of dispositional inferences (β = .72, p < .001),
whereas performance-level information (β = –.01, p >
.88) and FES (β = .04, p > .60) were not. The Sobel test
revealed that the reductions in the paths from perfor-
mance-level information (z = 3.29, p < .01) and from FES
level (z = 1.96, p = .05) to dispositional inferences were
significant when behavior categorizations were included
in the equation (see Figure 1).
Similar analyses were performed for the no-load con-
ditions. In the first step, neither performance informa-
tion (β = .07, p < .48) nor FES level (β = .09, p = .38) signifi-
cantly predicted adjusted dispositional inferences. The
second step was informative in that performance level
(β = .27, p = .01) significantly predicted adjusted behav-
ior categorizations, whereas the FES variable (β = .05, p >
.61) did not. The performance level effect, however, was
attenuated compared to that observed under load condi-
tions. Indeed, a comparison of the beta weights for the
effects of the performance-level variable under load and
no-load conditions revealed that the variance in behav-
ior categorizations that was accounted for by perfor-
mance level was significantly smaller under no-load than
load conditions (z = 2.01, p < .02). In the final equation of
the mediational analysis for no-load conditions, behav-
ior categorizations significantly predicted dispositional
inferences (β = .54, p < .001), whereas neither the perfor-
mance level (β = –.07, p > .43) nor the FES level variables
(β = .06, p > .47) did (see Figure 2).7, 8
SITUATIONAL INFERENCES
Did participants’ categorizations of the performance
significantly predict their adjusted task-difficulty rat-
ings? A regression analysis revealed that they did under
both the load (β = .27, p = .01) and no-load (β = .20, p =
.06) conditions. However, the direction of the relation-
ship was opposite to that suggested by Reich and Weary
(1998). Categorizations of the performance as success-
ful were associated with higher ratings of task difficulty.
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TABLE 2: Adjusted Performance Level × Cognitive Load Means
Cognitive Load No Load
Success Failure Success Failure
Variable (n = 48) (n = 46) (n = 47) (n = 47)
Dispositional
ability 7.10a (1.08) 6.16b (1.21) 6.70 (1.31) 6.47 (1.20)
Behavior
categorization 7.64a (1.01) 6.29b (1.20) 7.61c (1.16) 6.80d (1.43)
Task difficulty 6.05 (1.25) 6.06 (1.26) 5.84 (1.28) 5.97 (1.40)
NOTE: Within level of cognitive load, means with different subscripts
differ significantly at p < .01. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Figure 1 Categorization as a mediator of dispositional inferences in
cognitive load conditions of Study 2.
*p < .05. †p < .10.
Figure 2 Categorization as a mediator of dispositional inferences in
no-load conditions of Study 2.
*p < .05.
Did participants’ task-difficulty judgments affect their
dispositional inferences for the no-load conditions?
When adjusted task-difficulty ratings were added to the
final equation reported in the mediational analyses sec-
tion for the no-load conditions, the performance-level
main effect was not a significant predictor of
dispositional inferences (β = –.04, p > .64), nor was the
FES effect (β = .08, p > .33). However, both behavior cate-
gorizations (β = .48, p < .001) and task-difficulty infer-
ences (β = .31, p = .001) were significant predictors.
Did we again obtain evidence suggestive of
proceduralized correction of dispositional for task-diffi-
culty inferences under cognitive load conditions? When
adjusted task-difficulty ratings were added to the final
equation reported for the cognitive load conditions
above, neither the performance level (β = .05, p > .53)
nor the FES term (β = .08, p > .31) significantly predicted
ability inferences. However, behavior categorizations (β =
.61, p < .001) and task-difficulty inferences (β = .28, p <
.001) were both significant predictors of dispositional
inferences.9
ANCILLARY MEASURES
Again, to assess the possibilities that the interaction of
the cognitive load and performance-level manipulations
affected participants’ global evaluative judgments of the
target, we submitted participants’ ratings of the child’s
likability, sociability, and activity level to separate
four-way analyses. These revealed a main effect of FES on
likability ratings, F(1, 169) = 5.92, p < .02, such that nega-
tive FES participants thought the child was less likable
(M = 6.14) than did positive FES participants (M = 6.69).
Otherwise, no effects associated with FES levels, the Per-
formance Level × Load interaction on ratings of the tar-
get’s social skills, or activity level were obtained (ps > .10).
DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY
To ensure that the effects of FES on dispositional
inferences were due to chronic future-event expectan-
cies rather than to general depression levels, we per-
formed a four-way ANCOVA on dispositional inferences
with participants’ self-reported task engagement and
BDI scores as covariates. The results of this analysis indi-
cated that BDI was not a significant covariate (p = .32).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide evidence that
perceivers’ categorizations of the target’s behavior were
assimilated to the performance-level information under
both load and no-load conditions and that the effects of
this information on their dispositional characterizations
were mediated by their behavior categorizations. This
study also provided evidence that the effect of perfor-
mance level on behavior categorizations, although sig-
nificant, was attenuated under no-load conditions.
These findings suggest, then, that participants engaged
in some degree of recategorization for the perceived
diagnosticity or sufficiency of performance-level infor-
mation when they had sufficient cognitive resources
available.
In addition, Study 2 provided evidence regarding the
determinants of participants’ task-difficulty inferences.
Although neither the performance-level nor the cogni-
tive load manipulations affected such inferences (see
Note 3 for details regarding comparable findings in
Study 1), behavior categorizations did exert a direct
influence on them. The direction of the effect, however,
was inconsistent with expectations based on the reason-
ing of Reich and Weary (1998). They argued that catego-
rizations of behavior as successful (unsuccessful) should
result in interpretations of the nonfocal situational fac-
tor as a facilitative (inhibitory) causal force. According
to such logic, then, we should have found a negative rela-
tionship, if any, between behavior categorizations and
inferences of task difficulty. Instead, we found that cate-
gorizations of the target’s behavior as more successful
were associated with perceptions of the task as more
difficult.
The obtained relationship would seem to be more in
line with our earlier supposition that participants, at
least in the context of the cognitive ability task employed
here, might possess a compensatory schema relating
causes and effects. In addition to facilitating the
proceduralized correction of target inferences found in
this study and in Study 1, such a schema also would per-
mit a calibration of one cause (ability) against another
(an easy task) in accounting for a given effect (success).
One important implication of use of this kind of schema
is that the most confident inference about ability can be
made if the same level of success were achieved on a diffi-
cult task (Kelley, 1972). Our participants apparently
arrived at characterizations of the task that, given the
perceived level of success, would have permitted the
most confident goal-relevant inferences to be made.
They then effortlessly used these situational character-
izations to adjust their dispositional inferences. That is,
regardless of cognitive load, task-difficulty ratings
accounted for a significant amount of variance in ability
ratings even after controlling for performance level,
generalized expectancies, and behavior categorizations.
Of importance, this study also provided a direct test of
the effects of chronic expectancies on behavior categori-
zations and ability inferences under both load and
no-load conditions. Results of the omnibus ANOVA
showed only a marginal main effect of FES on
dispositional inferences rather than the FES × Load
interaction found in Reich and Weary (1998). Because
the performance-level information provided to partici-
pants limited the influence of participants’ chronic
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expectancies under load and no load, this result was not
unexpected. Still, regression analyses showed that, con-
sistent with Reich and Weary’s assumptions, under cog-
nitive load conditions, negative compared to positive
FES participants rated the target as less intelligent. In
addition, they showed that the effects of chronic expec-
tancies on dispositional inferences under cognitive load
conditions were mediated by behavior categorizations.
However, under no-load conditions, the effects of
chronic expectancies on categorizations of the perfor-
mance and on dispositional inferences were not signifi-
cant. Thus, the assimilative effect of chronic expectan-
cies on behavior categorizations appears to have been
relatively flexible; participants appeared to have cor-
rected their categorizations for the influence of these
expectancies when sufficient cognitive resources were
available, a point to which we will return below.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experimental studies, we examined the roles of
situational inferences, prior category information,
chronic expectancies, and behavior categorizations in
the process of drawing inferences of ability. Overall, the
results of both studies provided support for the hypothe-
sis that behavior categorizations and initial characteriza-
tions of a target’s disposition would be assimilated to
prior information about the level of performance
(Studies 1 and 2) and to chronic expectancies (Study 2)
under conditions of cognitive load. They also offered
support for the prediction that perceivers would correct
their dispositional inferences for the effects of the per-
formance-level information (Studies 1 and 2) and for
their chronic expectancies (Study 2) when they had the
requisite resources. Of importance, this inferential cor-
rection of dispositional inferences for both factors
appeared to result , in part, from behavioral
recategorization processes.
Because some researchers have argued that behav-
ioral recategorization does not generally occur (Trope &
Alfieri, 1997), it would seem important to consider
briefly why we were able to obtain evidence of such pro-
cesses in the current research. In a collateral research
program of ours, we have found that negative FES
perceivers generally are aware of the potential bias intro-
duced by their chronic expectancies and that they often
attempt to correct for such biases. The recategorization
for chronic expectancies observed in Study 2, then, may
well have been due to participants’ awareness of the bias-
ing influence of their expectancies and, when sufficient
cognitive resources were available, to their deliberate
correction of behavior categorizations for this perceived
bias. The fact that generalized future-event expectancies
are not inherently specific to the target and are not pro-
vided to participants as objective information also may
make behavior categorizations based on such expectan-
cies more amenable to recategorization. In contrast,
participants in previous research have been provided
with specific, unambiguous contextual information that
could be used to disambiguate target behaviors (e.g.,
Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope & Alfieri, 1997). At the correc-
tion stage, it is unlikely that perceivers in that research
would have reconsidered or identified such information
as a potential bias or as illegitimate. Therefore, it is
unlikely that they would have attempted to correct for its
effects on their categorizations of the observed behavior.
Similarly, our performance-level manipulation pro-
vided participants with specific information about
whether the target had met the time requirements.
Although such information probably served to limit the
magnitude of possible recategorization, it clearly aided
participants in categorizing the target’s behaviors. Its
diagnosticity and/or sufficiency, however, was (inten-
tionally) not so clear. This, combined with the fact that
the performance-level information was highly salient to
participants, in all likelihood resulted in an aware-
ness-based correction of dispositional inferences.
With growing evidence that recategorization can
occur (see also Thompson et al., 1994; Weary et al.,
1999), new research issues naturally arise. Does
recategorization require either the awareness of an ille-
gitimate biasing influence (Stapel, Martin, & Schwarz,
1998) or a strong motivation to be accurate? Is it gener-
ally less likely to occur when prior contextual cues are
specific, unambiguous, and apparently objective or legit-
imate? Certainly, we believe, as do other researchers
(Reeder, 1997), that investigation of the conditions
under which recategorization of behavior may occur is
an intriguing avenue for future research, as is the explo-
ration of the potentially complex consequences of such
recategorizations for the inference process.
As we noted earlier in this article, one major differ-
ence between the currently dominant models of the
dispositional inference process concerns the point at
which situational information is thought to exert an
influence on dispositional inferences. Gilbert’s model
(e.g., Gilbert et al., 1988) predicts that dispositional
inferences will be adjusted for situational factors only
during the later stages when perceivers have the cogni-
tive resources and motivation to engage in effortful cor-
rection processes. Trope’s (1986) model, on the other
hand, argues that situational information may influence
the early stages if it is particularly salient, accessible, and
applicable.
In both of our studies, we found evidence that partici-
pants’ inferences about the difficulty of the task affected
their relatively automatic ability inferences. That such
adjustment was found under cognitive load conditions,
when participants arguably were less able to engage in
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effortful processing, is noteworthy. Moreover, this appar-
ently proceduralized adjustment of target characteriza-
tions was obtained despite the fact that we did not pro-
vide our participants with specific, unambiguous
situational information and did not prompt them to cor-
rect their inferences for such information.
Overall, it seems likely that understanding the cir-
cumstances under which dispositional inferences are
corrected for situational factors will turn out to be a rela-
tively complex business. We argued that the apparently
effortless adjustment of target characterizations for task
difficulty observed in both of the current studies (and
recently replicated in another set of studies [Weary et al.,
1999]) resulted from the application of a pro-
ceduralized, compensatory attributional schema
(Kelley, 1972). The validity of this admittedly post hoc
argument, however, will need to be determined by future
research. In fact, we believe that considerable research
efforts should be directed toward investigating the deter-
minants of the implicit adjustment of dispositional infer-
ences for situational factors in various domains and by
various perceivers, as well as the possible impact of the
self-generation of inferences about the situational con-
text on focal judgments.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Previous research on assimilative identification and
mediation of dispositional inferences has relied largely
on prestructured, linguistic stimulus materials (e.g.,
Trope & Alfieri, 1997). Ours employed more naturalistic
and complex stimuli that required perceivers to infer
behavioral and situational information from observa-
tion of a behavioral episode spanning some time period.
The results of this research both supported and
extended previous work concerning the processes by
which social inferences are influenced by diverse sources
of contextual information. Evidence of both pro-
ceduralized and effortful correction of dispositional
inferences for several contextual factors was obtained. In
addition, support for a corrective process insufficiently
examined by attribution researchers, recategorization of
observed behavior, was found. Thus, the findings of the
current research expand our understanding of the com-
plicated and intriguing process by which perceivers draw
inferences about the enduring dispositions of others.
NOTES
1. A pilot study revealed that, as intended, participants who
received the failure information compared to those who received the
success information expected the child to perform significantly worse,
F(1, 51) = 29.93, p < .001.
2. Participant gender was included as a factor in all analyses of stud-
ies 1 and 2. However, because relatively few effects associated with this
variable were found and because those few that were obtained were not
predicted, did not replicate across studies, and did not qualify our
major findings, we do not report any of the significant gender effects
here. Interested readers should contact the authors for information
relevant to these effects. In addition, for Study 1, effects of order of the
target and task inference measures were examined. The only effect
that occurred was a three-way interaction of load, performance level,
and order on the task-difficulty measure, indicating that the obtained
Load × Performance Level interaction occurred only when the task-
difficulty measure was first. In Study 2, no effects associated with order
of behavior categorization and dispositional inference measures were
found.
3. In keeping with past theory and research, we postulated that situ-
ational inferences would be used to adjust dispositional ones, not vice
versa. That is, when perceivers have a dispositional inference goal, as
they did in the present research, evidence (Krull & Dill, 1996) indicates
that dispositional inferences precede situational ones and that the lat-
ter are used to adjust the former, given adequate levels of perceiver
ability and motivation. Still, in the current research one cannot rule
out the possibility that dispositional inferences affected situational
ones.
4. Finally, it also should be noted that one participant failed to com-
plete the self-report assessment of task engagement; the data for that
participant were excluded from relevant analyses.
5. Although our use of a median split approach to categorize partic-
ipants as possessing positive or negative future-event expectancies is
consistent with past research (e.g., Reich & Weary, 1998), it also may
have resulted in the misclassification of some participants whose scores
on the future-event expectancy scale (FES) fell close to the median.
However, an examination of the results for participants in the top and
bottom thirds of the distribution on the FES revealed that the effect
sizes for FES, performance level, and the Performance Level × Load
interaction (r s = .15, .16, .17) on dispositional inferences were compa-
rable to those found for the median split analysis (r s = .14, .22, .15).
6. A pilot study revealed, as predicted, that positive FES participants
expected the child to perform significantly better than did negative
FES participants, F(1, 65) = 5.77, p < .02.
7. Strictly speaking, evidence of mediation requires significant
effects only at Steps 2 and 3, which, in turn, typically imply a significant
result at Step 1. However, Step 1 may not yield significant effects of the
exogenous variable on the criterion if the mediator is acting as a sup-
pressor. The presence of suppression is suggested when, in the final
equation, the mediational paths differ in sign from the direct path
(Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).
8. In light of the unexpected interaction of performance level and
load on recall of the details of the videotape, we also included recall
scores in the mediational analyses for load and no-load participants.
For no step in either analysis did recall significantly predict the crite-
rion (all recall ps > .10), neither did inclusion of recall scores in the
analyses alter any of the other effects reported.
9. Regressions controlling for the effects of cognitive load, behavior
categorizations, and FES group revealed that task-difficulty inferences
significantly predicted ability ratings in both the successful (β = .436,
p < .001) and the unsuccessful (β = .201, p < .02) performance condi-
tions. Thus, situational correction was not limited to the unsuccessful
performance condition.
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